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STORIES FROM THE GENDER GARDEN: TRANSSEXUALS
AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
PATRICIA A. CAIN"
I. THE BEGINNING
It was only a dream, but it seemed real at the time.
I stood in the middle of a forest and looked into a stream of water,
much as Narcissus must have done. The water reflected as clearly as
a mirror. When I saw my reflection, I said: "I am a flower."
The trees of the forest came alive and spoke. "You are a daffodil,"
they said. But I knew otherwise.
"No, a hyacinth," I said.
We could not agree. I was one or the other and we could not agree.
Then the god of light and wisdom appeared. The god said that I was
both a daffodil and a hyacinth and I was happy.
But then the rule was written. The rule said: "A flower is special and
cannot be harmed." The interpreters said that a daffodil was a flower
and a hyacinth was a flower. At first, I felt protected and warm.
Then one day I was threatened by a great wind. I said to the wind: "I
am a flower and you cannot harm me." The wind began to hum. Then
the wind began to laugh. "You are not a flower," said the wind. "You
are not a daffodil and you are not a hyacinth."
"Yes, I am. I am both daffodil and hyacinth."
And as the wind blew over me and trampled me to the ground, I
heard it say: "Not a flower, not a flower, not a flower."
And the interpreters agreed with the great wind. "A daffodil/hyacinth
is not A flower," said the interpreters. "If you are both, you are nei-
ther. You are not A flower and you are not protected. Only A flower
is special."
I protested, but to no avail. If a daffodil is special and a hyacinth is
special, then shouldn't a daffodil/hyacinth be even more special? Is it
not worse to destroy both?
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa; A.B., Vassar College, 1968; J.D., University of
Georgia, 1973. Special thanks to Jean C. Love for editorial comments and to all the participants at
the University of Denver College of Law Symposium on InterSEXionality for their questions,
criticisms, and encouragement. I owe an additional debt of gratitude to the University of Wisconsin
Law School for inviting me to present a version of this paper at a faculty workshop in the spring of
1998. My research assistant, Jill Krueger, J.D. Iowa, 1998, provided not only research support, but a
creative ear as she listened to the many ideas (some good, some bad) that were suggested by this
project.
HeinOnline  -- 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1321 1997-1998
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The dream is easy to explain. It is spring and, despite the recent
snows in the Midwest, my daffodils are starting to bloom. The hyacinth
was my favorite flower in childhood, but only the blue ones. I used to
crush their blooms into pixie dust so that I could fly. Sometimes I was
Peter Pan. Sometimes I was Superboy (but never Supergirl).
For months now I have immersed myself in the stories of female to
male transsexuals (FTMs), "boychicks" who are considering some form
of physical transition from femaleness to maleness, and butch lesbians
who embrace their female bodies while also embracing forms of mascu-
line gender expression. My reading has also included stories of male to
female transsexuals (MTFs). In addition, I have read every case of dis-
crimination against such people that has been reported in the federal or
state reporters. Most discrimination cases involve MTFs, but there are a
handful of cases in which FTMs are plaintiffs. The message from the
courts to the plaintiffs is the same in both cases: Men are protected from
discrimination and women are protected from discrimination, but you, as
a transsexual, are not protected. You are not a "sex." You are something
else.
The stories of butch lesbians, especially from the 1960s and 70s,
contain similar themes of rejection. This period was the heyday of civil
rights activism and the era of origin for anti-discrimination laws that
focus on sex and gender. For butch lesbians, it was not the legal system
that threatened their claims to masculine identity in a female body.
Rather it was the feminist community, and in particular lesbians within
that community, who began demanding that for lesbians to be true femi-
nists they must be "woman-identified."' Butch or masculine-identified
women were suddenly "politically incorrect."2
Similarly, progressive lesbian communities of the 1980s and 90s
have policed their borders by rejecting MTF transsexuals who claim les-
bian identity in a post-op female body. The Michigan Womyn's Music
Festival, for example, adopted a "womyn born womyn" rule in 1992 to
protect their female-only space.'
It seems, then, that in American law and society, sex is either male
or female. Gender is either masculine or feminine. Furthermore, mascu-
line gender is expected to correlate to male sex, feminine gender to fe-
1. "Because the proposition that lesbianism is an intensified form of female bonding has
become a belief, thinking, acting, or looking like a man contradicts lesbian feminism's first
principle: the lesbian is a 'woman-identified woman."' Esther Newton, The Mythic Mannish
Lesbian: Radclyffe Hall and the New Woman, 9 SIGNS 557, 557-58 (1984).
2. See Jeanne Cordova, Butches, Lies, and Feminism, in THE PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-
BUTCH READER 272, 272 (Joan Nestle ed., 1992).
3. See Nan Alamilla Boyd, Bodies in Motion: Lesbian and Transsexual Histories, in A
QUEER WORLD: THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 134, 143-45 (Martin
Duberman ed., 1997) (discussing exclusion of transsexual women from Michigan Womyn's Music
Festival).
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male sex. Persons who do not fit these categories are unprotected by the
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.' And persons who
blend masculine and feminine characteristics or one sex (e.g., female)
with the opposite gender (e.g., masculine) risk rejection, not only by our
legal institutions, but also by progressive communities.
Title VII' protects employees against discrimination on account of
6sex. Numerous state statutes protect persons from sex discrimination in
employment,7 housing,' credit,9 and education.'" At least ten states and the
District of Columbia have statutes that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation." And Congress is considering once again the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would make employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation illegal in all states.' 2
With two exceptions, 3 none of these statutory protections offers any
protection to transsexual or transgendered individuals."
4. See, e.g., Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 1983)
(holding that a transsexual in transition cannot claim discrimination on the basis of sex because "the
common usage of the word sex denotes male or female, but not both").
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
6. Id. § 2000e-2.
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1996).
8. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10 (Supp. 1997).
9. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81f (1997).
10. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 5 (West 1996).
11. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81d; D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. §
378-2 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553-10(G) (West Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4; MINN. STAT. § 363.03; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
961(6) (1995); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(d) (West 1997).
12. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, S. 869, 105th Cong. The Senate rejected
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong., by a vote of 50 to 49. 142
CONG. REc. S10,129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).
13. The exceptions are Minnesota (by statute) and New York (by case law). The Minnesota
human rights laws prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. MINN.
STAT. § 363.03. "Sexual orientation" is defined as:
[Hiaving or being perceived as having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to
another person without regard to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as
having an orientation for such attachment, or having or being perceived as having a self-
image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
femaleness.
Id. § 363.01 (emphasis added).
A New York court, in Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., provided protection to transsexuals
under New York City law by interpreting "sex" to include transsexuals. 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96
(App. Div. 1995) (rejecting, as "unduly restrictive," the federal courts' position that Title VII's
proscription against sex discrimination does not protect transsexuals). While the Maffei decision was
ambiguous as to the applicability of New York state law to transsexuals, a reasonable interpretation
of the decision, including its discussion of the more expansive nature of the state law as compared to
Title VII, indicates that the court recognized protections for transsexuals under New York state law
as well. See id. at 392-96; see also Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL
737215, at *9 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (interpreting the Maffei decision to protect transsexuals
under New York state, as well as city, law). In Rentos, a federal court applying New York state and
city law denied defendant's motion to dismiss, recognizing that the Maffei decision indicated that the
transsexual plaintiff potentially had a claim under these laws. See id. at *8-*9 ("Any ambiguity as to
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Why is it that our jurisprudence has developed a notion of sex, gen-
der, and sexual orientation that completely excludes transsexual or trans-
gendered persons? Are transsexual persons neither male nor female un-
der the law, and thus undeserving of protections that are available for
men and for women? Is our understanding of "discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex" so limited that it cannot accommodate the situation of a per-
son who was assigned one sex at birth, but has developed a different
gender identity throughout life? And how does our anti-discrimination
jurisprudence accommodate the biologically intersexed person or her-
maphrodite, whose sex and gender are blurred so as to defy classification
in our binary system?
Perhaps the problem is not with our jurisprudential vision, but with
our inability to visualize what it means to be transsexual or transgen-
dered. And if, as it appears, some of our most progressive political com-
munities experience difficulty with the blending of genders and sexes,
then perhaps we need to do some additional consciousness-raising on the
situation of transsexuals.
The purpose of this article is to enrich our understanding of trans-
sexuals and transgendered persons so that we can better determine
whether their experiences of discrimination ought to fall within existing
legal categories or whether we need to create new legal categories. To
this end, I will employ the method that feminist legal theorists of the
1970s and 80s used to develop new legal theories for the benefit of bat-
the plaintiff's protected status is... merely reflective of the present state of the law, and the
complaint clearly alleges membership in what [the Maffei] court has found to be a protected class
under city and state law.").
14. Although courts consistently interpret Title VII to exclude transsexuals from
antidiscrimination protection, see Rentos, 1996 WL 737215, at *7 ("Every federal court that has
considered the question has rejected the application of [Title VII] to a transsexual claiming
employent discrimination."), Title IX has recently been applied in a sexual harassment case in which
the plaintiff was a transsexual, harassed because she appeared female to the harasser. See Miles v.
New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("There is no conceivable reason why such
conduct should be rewarded with legal pardon just because, unbeknownst to [the harasser] and
everyone else at the university, plaintiff was not a biological female."). Title IX's sex discrimination
language is equivalent to the language in Title VII. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (Title IX
language: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex . . . be subjected to
discrimination under any education program .... ), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (Title VII
language: "It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual.., because of such individual's ... sex."). Thus, the two statutes should be interpreted to
apply to similar discriminatory behavior. See Miles, 979 F. Supp. at 249-50 & n.4 (recognizing that
"it is now established" that the sex discrimination language in Title VII and Title IX are interpreted
in the same manner). In addition, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989), a case in which a woman was discriminated against for not being feminine
enough, signals the possibility for future application of Title VII to cases involving transsexuals. See
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (finding "because of such individual's.., sex" language in Title
VII "mean[s] that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions"). The Court's discussion in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), also contains language which
might support future claims by transsexual plaintiffs. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (stating that
"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils").
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tered women and women in the workplace who were harassed. That
method entails listening to and believing stories of the oppressed-"sto-
ries from the bottom," as Mari Matsuda would call them."
Part II of this article will outline briefly what I mean by feminist
method. In Part Ill, I will describe what I mean by "differently gendered
persons." Part IV focuses on the stories of differently gendered persons.
After making some preliminary observations about those stories in Part
V, I conclude in Part VI with some suggestions for legal reform in the
area of anti-discrimination law.
II. FEMINIST METHOD
A. Consciousness-Raising as Feminist Method
As Chris Littleton explained years ago: "Feminist method starts
with the very radical act of taking women seriously, believing that what
we say about ourselves and our experience is important and valid, even
when (or perhaps especially when) it has little or no relationship to what
has been or is being said about us."'6 For me this is still the starting place
for constructing feminist legal theories, listening to and believing
women's stories. It means holding back the critiques and the judgments
until the story has been heard in full-with empathy and understanding.
Some feminist theorists have described this process as akin to con-
sciousness-raising." Imagine a group of women sharing with each other
their stories and perspectives-stories and perspectives they have never
shared before; for some out of fear, for some as a result of the indiffer-
ence of available listeners. The process builds a new understanding of
previously silenced experiences and the women sharing in the process
gain insights about their own stories.
Consciousness-raising has been described as the "personal reporting
of experience in communal settings to explore what has not been said."'8
It enables "feminists to draw insights and perceptions from their own
experiences and those of other women and to use these insights to chal-
lenge dominant versions of social reality.""
This process of telling and hearing stories is credited with the for-
mulation of legal theories dealing with sexual harassment, pornography,
15. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); see also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (providing
further discussion of Matsuda's term).
16. Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 764 (1989) (reviewing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINSM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
17. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 863-67
(1990) (discussing consciousness-raising through the articulation of experiences as a "feminist
method for expanding perceptions").
18. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10,64(1987).
19. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 866.
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battered women, and rape." It has also helped us to understand connec-
tions between sexism and racism.
There is a risk to this form of feminist method. For example, Andrea
Stuart argues that "[e]ncounter groups and consciousness raising seem[ ]
most pertinent to a privileged few, largely white and middle-class, who
[are] lucky enough to be able to put to one side issues of race and
class .... ,,21 Critics charge that consciousness-raising may produce a
feminist "movement side-tracked by a peculiarly narcissistic dimension
of 'the personal is the political.' 2  Others charge that the consciousness-
raising "model 'works' mainly in a culture that prioritizes individual,
rather than collectivist, strategies and solutions.
23
"Difference feminism" has emerged from this method, offering a
critique of reality from the perspective of women, a perspective that is
claimed to be different from that of men.' To the extent difference femi-
nism has relied on or even suggested the existence of a monolithic and
coherent woman's standpoint, it has been criticized for its failure to in-
clude the voices and viewpoints of diverse women. Racial critiques25 and
lesbian critiques26 have claimed that feminist standpoint theories too of-
ten ignore the realities and experiences of women of color and lesbians.
Thus, according to these critiques, the truths such standpoint theories
offer are only partial.
I have argued elsewhere that lesbian experience must be understood
and included in feminist critiques. Legal solutions that ignore lesbian
experience may contribute to the continued subordination of lesbians.
Such solutions are not really feminist, for feminism means working
against the subordination of all women. Relational or cultural feminis 8
arguments that value the biological connection between mother and
20. See, e.g., id. at 864-65; cf Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 642-48 (1986) (addressing the
effects of feminist thought and discourse on sexual harassment and battered women).
21. Andrea Stuart, Feminism: Dead or Alive?, in IDENTITY: COMMUNITY, CULTURE,
DIFFERENCE 28, 37 (Jonathan Rutherford ed., 1990).
22. Id.
23. Kobena Mercer & Isaac Julien, Race, Sexual Politics and Black Masculinity: A Dossier, in
MALE ORDER: UNWRAPPING MASCULINITY 97, 122 (Rowena Chapman & Jonathan Rutherford eds.,
1988).
24. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (discussing the existence and implications of distinctions between
male and female modes of observation and communication).
25. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990).
26. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Difference feminism is sometimes called cultural feminism and cultural feminists often
stress relationships between women and children. See,- e.g., Susan H. Williams & David C. Williams,
A Feminist Theory of Malebashing, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 35, 110-15 (1996).
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child,29 for example, may serve to devalue the mother and child connec-
tion for the lesbian mother who is a "second parent."3
Linda McClain has described the problems that may result from a
misuse of feminist method. In a recent article, she says:
There has been a deep impulse in feminism, throughout its his-
tory, to engage in judgment or critical evaluation with a view to
helping women. Arguably, the role of consciousness-raising as a
feminist method yielding knowledge about women's lives reflects
this impulse. But, as applied to other women, a stance of judgment
may suggest an us/them or self/other relationship in which feminists
attempt to interpret the experience and voices of other women. Par-
ticularly when differences such as race, ethnicity, and class exist,
there are risks of incomprehension and misinterpretation, as well as
solipsistic use of one's own experience as a measure or norm. The
consequences are exacerbated when the interpreter is in a position of
power (e.g., to prescribe policy agendas or to regulate the lives of the
women under interpretation)."
The task of feminist method is to listen openly to those women who
are different from us, especially the most subordinated-to hear their
stories as best we can and to check our theories against the interests of
those we have listened to. In addition, we must be slow to generalize,
slow to build grand theory-or at least willing to revise our theories con-
tinuously in light of new knowledge.
B. Narrative and Stories from the Bottom
Consciousness-raising implies dialog, the sharing of stories. My
method in this article is not true consciousness-raising because I have not
engaged in rap sessions or dialog groups with FTMs or other differently
gendered persons. But like consciousness-raising, my method begins
with the real life experiences of FTMs and other differently gendered
persons. I have lurked on internet discussion lists dealing with FTM
identity and immersed myself in autobiographies, personal statements,
and interviews with FTMs and cross-dressers. In this article, I will offer
legal theories based on the listening I have done. In addition, I will share
29. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 12 (1988)
(criticizing dominant legal doctrine for valuing separation rather than connectedness). Feminists who
value maternal connections argue in favor of the maternal presumption in child custody. See Rena K.
Uriller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 107, 127 (1978).
30. The nonbiological second mother is rarely recognized as a parent for purposes of seeking
visitation with a child she has raised jointly with the biological mother. See, e.g., Curiale v. Reagan,
272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990) (partner of biological motHer has no standing to claim visitation
rights); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (partner of adoptive mother has no standing to
claim visitation rights).
31. Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 339, 446 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
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with readers some of the stories I have heard. Thus, this article embraces
both the narrative and analytic traditions in legal scholarship."
Narrative has been used by critical race scholars" as well as by
feminist scholars" to communicate the experiences of the subordinated to
others. Different scholars make different claims regarding the value of
narrative scholarship. Some claim that the narrative standing alone is
sufficient if it causes others to engage in paradigm shifts regarding legal
positions or theories. Some claim that some narratives have more value
than others. And some claim that the truth of the narratives is irrelevant
to their value. Stories have power as stories whether true or not.
I wish to avoid as much of this debate as possible. I make a simple
claim: By listening to the stories of differently gendered persons, I learn
something about their lives. I don't claim truth or higher value for these
stories. I retell the ones that resonate with me, the ones that have raised
my consciousness. I retell these stories for a concrete purpose: to ques-
tion the current judicial understanding of sex discrimination law, an un-
derstanding that has denied meaningful existence to persons who are not
at all times clearly categorized as either male or female.
The stories I have chosen for this project are the stories of women
who identify as men or as masculine, including butch lesbians and
FTMs. I have chosen to focus primarily on FTM experience because, in
the transsexual/transgender world, their stories are the "stories from the
bottom."
"Stories from the bottom" is a concept introduced by Mar Matsuda
when she argued in a 1987 article:
[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special
voice to which we should listen. Looking to the bottom-adopting
the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the lib-
32. See Jean C. Love, The Value of Narrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 J.
GENDER, RACE, & JUSTICE (forthcoming 1998).
33. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Charles R.
Lawrence, III, A Dream: On Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10 NOVA L.J. 627 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77
IOWA L. REV. 19, 38 (1991) (calling for feminist scholars to translate experience to those who are
strangers to the experience); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1688 (1990) (stating that stories are used
in the hope that they "can create a bridge across gaps in experience and thereby elicit empathetic
understanding").
35. For the substance of the debate, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 971 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994);
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on
Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
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eral promise--can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the
phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.s6
Professor Matsuda's claim was that "the victims of racial oppression
have distinct normative insights."" I make a more modest claim. Victims
of discrimination whose stories have not been heard will always teach us
something about discrimination. Their perspective need not be more
valuable or more "true" in order to teach us something. The purpose of
feminist method is not to uncover truth, the view from nowhere. It is to
uncover new perspectives, new views from lives and stories that have not
been heard before. FTM stories can teach us something about gender
discrimination-and they are stories that have been ignored, have gone
unheard.
James Green, president of FTM International says:
The FTM population suffers greatly from marginalization, even
within the cultural dialog on transgender and transsexualism. We
have a hard time getting published-perhaps because no one takes us
seriously, perhaps because we were once women, perhaps because we
are simply invisible, not as threatening as people who cut off their
penises."
In his book, Female-to-Male Transsexualism, Dr. Leslie Lothstein
says:
When transsexualism was finally included as a disorder [by the
American Psychiatric Association in 1980] there was no attempt to
separate male from female transsexualism. Consequently, there were
no guidelines for evaluating, diagnosing, and treating female trans-
sexualism as a distinct clinical entity. If the disorder of transsexual-
ism was ever mentioned in the major psychology and psychiatry
texts, it was either given short shrift or the focus, however brief, was
on male transsexualism.3 9
Gordene Olga MacKenzie, in her book, Transgender Nation, reports
that anthropologists have reported less on FIMs (sometimes called
"amazons") as compared with MTFs. She cites Paula Gunn Allen's ex-
planation that "fewer accounts of cross-gender women exist because
women have always been considered less important than men."
36. Matsuda, supra note 15, at 324; see also Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
37. Matsuda, supra note 15, at 326.
38. Email from Jamison Green to Pat Cain (Feb. 3, 1998) (on file with the author); see also C.
Jacob Hale, Consuming the Living, Dis(re)membering the Dead in the Butch/FTM Borderlands, 4
GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STuD. 311, 329-30 (1998) (noting that MTFs have more power in
community organizations than FTMs, as well as greater access to the media, and explaining how
current discourses on transsexuality ignore the specifics of FTM experience).
39. LESLIE MARTIN LOTHsTEiN, FEMALE-TO-MALE TRANSSEXUALISM: HISTORICAL,
CLINIcAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 4 (1983).
40. GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 32 (1994).
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In addition, feminist legal and non-legal scholarship has tended to
focus more on the MTF than on the FTM. Janice Raymond, a feminist
scholar, wrote an early scathing critique of what she calls "The Trans-
sexual Empire," arguing that with sex reassignment surgery, the medical
profession has attempted to control the very definition of what it means
to be a woman." By relying on overly essentialized notions of femininity,
doctors require men who want to become women to conform to their idea
of the ideal woman." Women who want to become men (FTMs) are at
the margin of her analysis. They are viewed as tokens necessary to make
the enterprise appear even-handed.43
Much feminist scholarship has focused on the meaning of "woman."
Scholars have debated whether MTFs should count as women. The issue
arises most frequently in the context of debates over separate space for
women, raising the question of who counts as a woman for those pur-
poses." Rarely, however, do these discussions include questions about
women who have become men.
Feminist method is about uncovering silences. It is about learning
from subordinate perspectives that have been ignored by the dominant
discourse. Listening to the narratives of the differently gendered, and
FTMs in particular, is feminist method. Retelling those stories in an at-
tempt to raise consciousness and create paradigm shifts in gender dis-
crimination law is feminist method applied.
C. Personal Perspective
It has become common for feminist legal scholars to identify their
personal connections to the subject matter they have chosen to address in
law review articles. Feminists who write about rape often identify as rape
victims" and feminists who write about domestic abuse often identify as
abuse survivors." Others tell personal stories of childbirth, 8 discrimina-
tion, '9 or family disputes,0 when writing about related topics. Although I
41. See JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE
91-98 (1979).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26-28.
44. See Boyd, supra note 3, at 143-48; see also Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered
Politics of Identity: Who Owns the Label "Lesbian"?, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1997).
45. But see Arriola, supra note 44, at 27 (raising question of whether lesbian partner of
woman who becomes a man can still claim the label "lesbian").
46. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); see also Lynne N. Henderson,
The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938 n.3 (1985) (identifying the author as a
victim of a violent crime).
47. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 34, at 8.
48. See Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction"
and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 514
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recognize that there are objections to these "personal footnotes,"5' I agree
and support this feminist move in legal scholarship. My position is not
based on a belief that the survivor of domestic abuse or rape or other
sexual violence has a special claim to truth about the subject. Rather, my
position is based on an ethical concern that when one is writing about
topics that are closely connected to one's personal experience, as a
scholar, one is under a special responsibility to disclose the experiences
or connections that might affect the author's "voice."
With respect to the topic of this article, I claim no special knowl-
edge, no special subjective access to truth, and no special ability at ob-
jective analysis. But I do have a connection or perspective with respect to
the topic of butch lesbians and FTMs, and I believe it is worth reporting.
The reader can then read my analysis through whatever lens is suggested
by my connection and perspective.
I identify today as a lesbian and have often identified as a butch les-
bian. When I was growing up in the 1940s and 1950s, I would have
given anything to be transformed from female to male. I was very relig-
ious as a child and often prayed to God that He would miraculously
transform me from female to male. My prayers were very specific in that
I wished to wake up with a male body. My wishes seem to me now to
have had nothing to do with sexual feelings, because the longings for a
male body predated any memory of sexual arousal or awareness. I was
athletic and hated the limitations placed on females in the 1950s regard-
ing athletic options. I always identified with male heroes, whether in
ancient myths or in modern cowboy stories. I thought many females were
silly. At the same time, I had many female friends who were tomboys
and who shared my love of athletics. Not surprisingly, I experienced a
profound internal crisis when my body began to take a more female
shape at age ten or eleven. Because people didn't talk about such things
as gender identity in those days, I never discussed any of these longings
or feelings with anyone when I was growing up. Rather, I survived the
experience in silence.
I embraced the concept of "women loving women" and the label
"lesbian" as soon as I became aware of the existence of lesbians, which
was sometime in my twenties. Despite my deep religious beliefs and
experiences, I never viewed myself as a sinner because I loved women
and I never felt that my religion required me to distance myself from
(1992); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 128-29 (1987).
50. See, e.g., Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral,
Child-Centered Approach to Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 3-6 (1996)
(beginning with a personal story about the naming of her own children).
51. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon ": The Human Voice in Legal Rules,
66 TEx. L. REv. 589, 598-600 (1988) (arguing such personal accounts are often irrelevant to the
author's legal scholarship).
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lesbian love. To me, love has always been good, and honest love is above
reproach. Such beliefs and attitudes seemed perfectly consistent with
what I had learned about love in my church.1
2
I had never considered the possibility of using medical science to ac-
complish the goal of my unanswered prayers until I began this project.
This project has made me confront that possibility. But it took very little
time for me to realize that, somewhere between the ages of four and
forty, I made peace with my female body and my masculine gender
identity.
Given my personal perspective, my reaction upon hearing the indi-
vidual stories that I uncovered in this project was to feel a deep sense of
connection with the storytellers. I felt no need to distance myself in order
to maintain my own identity. At the same time, I know that I have no
special connection that makes FTM stories more transparent to me than
to others. I may connect more easily with certain FTMs, and we may
share some common life experiences, but I have learned that the differ-
ences of time, class, race, and geography are just as real here as in other
narratives. Moreover, there is no meta-FTM narrative, despite the medi-
cal profession's attempt to create one for diagnostic purposes.
During my work on this project, I have been accused by some of
being a voyeur, of stepping into areas that I know nothing about. Such
complaints come primarily from those who believe I have no special
connection with FTM experience, some of whom even suggest that I am
not sufficiently "butch" to claim that label. These charges, although dis-
turbing at a number of levels, have helped to raise my own consciousness
about the dangers of identity politics and of legal analysis based on iden-
tity categories. Although I firmly believe in a subject's right to self iden-
tification, I am also committed to projects that deconstruct fixed or rigid
categories, even those embraced by the very subjects whose life experi-
ences I honor and respect. As a listener in this project, therefore, I have
endeavored to be open-minded and understanding, while at the same
time questioning the basic premise of bipolar sex identity upon which
FTM identity and narrative is based.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN To BE DIFFERENTLY GENDERED?
In law, as well as in other disciplines, the term "sex" has come to
mean biological sex and "gender" has come to mean that which is so-
cially constructed. Thus, one's sex is either male or female, and one's
52. I grew up in the Southern Baptist Church. I can't explain why I, unlike other Southern
Baptists, developed a sense of love that included same-sex love. I always believed in the power of
faith to move mountains and I always believed that honesty was the greatest virtue of all. Being true
to myself, including being honest about the love I felt for women, was absolutely consistent with my
own religious principles as I developed them while an active member of the First Baptist Chruch in
my home town.
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gender may be either masculine or feminine. This binary classification
system is much too constrained to embrace all of reality. Some people
are intersexed in that they combine both male and female biological
traits. Sometimes the balance between male and female is sufficiently
even that we cannot tell for certain whether a person is one or the other.
Nonetheless, such intersexed people are assigned a single sex at birth. 3
Thus, they begin their lives in the assigned sex role with expectations
that gender will conform to the assigned sex. Later in life, it may turn out
that some such persons develop secondary sex characteristics of the sex
opposite to the one assigned. At that time, reassignment will be difficult,
although surgical intervention can sometimes help.
Some people begin their lives in one biological sex (e.g., female),
but with a strong gender identity of the opposite sex (e.g., male or mas-
culine). Many butch lesbians fit within this category, ' as do some man-
nish heterosexual women. With the help of modern medicine, some of
these differently gendered people elect to go through treatments that will
more nearly align their bodies (i.e., their biological sex) with their gender
identity.
Some butch lesbians spend a lot of time working on their bodies to
become more masculine in appearance. They work out at gyms and
health clubs. Some even elect breast reduction surgery, often for good
medical reasons, but buttressed by a desire to appear more butch or mas-
culine.55 FTMs also work on their bodies and have surgeries. Some start
with breast reduction and end up with double mastectomies. Most FTMs
have hormone therapy treatments. That is, they take testosterone on a
regular basis. Some individuals who identify as FTM avoid taking hor-
53. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.2.b (presenting the stories of Thomas Hall and
Lynn Edward Harris).
54. The term "butch" is more fluid than my use of it in the text might suggest. Within the
lesbian community, butch and femme are terms that describe behaviors of individuals as well as
relationships between two women. Although some might perceive the labels as fixed (i.e., a butch is
always a butch), others perceive the labels as relative (e.g., in every couple one person is more hutch
than the other and a woman who is butch in one relationship might be perceived as femme in another
relationship). For purposes of this article, my use of the term "butch" is closest in meaning to that
offered by Gayle Rubin:
Butch is the lesbian vernacular term for women who are more comfortable with
masculine gender codes, styles, or identities than with feminine ones. The term
encompasses individuals with a broad range of investments in "masculinity." It includes,
for example, women who are not at all interested in male gender identities, but who use
traits associated with masculinity to signal their lesbianism or to communicate their
desire to engage in the kinds of active or initiatory sexual behaviors that in this society
are allowed or expected from men.
Gayle Rubin, Of Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries, in THE
PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-BUTCH READER, supra note 2, at 466,467.
55. For example, short of sex reassignment surgery, some butch lesbians will elect breast
reduction surgery so that their bodies become more aligned with their gender identities. See Maj
Plumb, Butch Identity, Breast Reduction, and the Chicago Cubs, GIRLFRIENDS 25, 27 (March 1998),
excerpted from THE LESBIAN HEALTH BOOK: CARING FOR OURSELVES (Jocelyn White & Marissa C.
Martinez, eds. 1997).
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mones because they fear the consequences of taking a powerful drug like
testosterone, which changes more than appearance.
Butch lesbians differ from FTMs in that they identify as women,
both privately and publicly, despite the fact that they embrace some at-
tributes of masculinity. This category would include persons identified as
female at birth or later.
5 6
Many scholars identify transsexual persons as those who desire sur-
gery in order to change their physical bodies so that the body will more
closely align with gender identity.57 Thus, the desire for sex reassignment
surgery has come to be understood as the key factor that divides true
transsexuals from other transgendered persons. The focus on surgery or
the desire for surgery is troubling, especially as a defining line for FTMs.
Breast reductions or mastectomies are surgical interventions, but are not
solely thought of as sex reassignment surgeries because they are avail-
able to women for other purposes. 8 Many, perhaps most, FTMs decline
to purchase genital reconstructive surgeries. 9 Thus, for many, hormone
treatment is the primary medical intervention.
In this article, my focus is on women who were identified as female
at birth, but who claim some degree of masculine identification, regard-
56. I include in the category of masculine or butch women, persons who may have
transitioned to a female body through sex reassignment surgery. I certainly do not intend to exclude
MTF transsexuals from the category "woman" or the category "lesbian" as certain feminist
organizations have tried to do. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 3, at 143-45 (discussing exclusion of
transsexual women from Michigan Womyn's Music Festival).
57. See, e.g., BERNICE L. HAUSMAN, CHANGING SEX: TRANSEXUALISM, TECHNOLOGY, AND
THE IDEA OF GENDER 72-109 (1995) (examining case studies); Ken Morris & Candace Hellen
Brown, The Alan Lucill Hart Story, 6 TNT: TRANSSEXUAL NEWS TELEGRAPH 3, 14 (1996) (stating
that "[i]t is not surgery which defines a transsexual, but the internal visualization and experience of
the body as being of the opposite sex" and the resulting "desire to bring the body into conformity
with the internal image").
58. Breast surgery is included as genital surgery in the Standards of Care first published by the
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association. See HARRY BENJAMIN
INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION, INC., STANDARDS OF CARE: THE HORMONAL
AND SURGICAL SEx REASSIGNMENT OF GENDER DYSPHORIC PERSONS (1990) [hereinafter
BENJAMIN STANDARDS], reprinted in GENDER BLENDING 505 (Bonnie Bullough et al. eds., 1997).
The standards require a second opinion before surgery is authorized. Id. § 4.7.5 Standard 7, reprinted
in GENDER BLENDING, at 515. No second opinion is required for hormone therapy. Before genital
sex reassignment is authorized, the patient must live full-time in the social role of the genetically
opposite sex for a year. Id. § 4.9.1 Standard 9, reprinted in GENDER BLENDING, at 515. No such 12
month requirement precedes breast surgery.
59. See HOLLY DEVOR, FrM: FEMALE-TO-MALE TRANSSEXUALS IN SOCIETY 447 (1997).
There are several reasons why FTMs are more likely than MTFs to decline genital reconstructive
surgery. First, FTMs are generally successful in changing their gender attribution from female to
male without surgery. Apparently individuals feel less compelled to have surgery once they are
recognized as members of the new gender. In addition, the quality of phalloplasty surgery in terms of
both aesthetics and function is not high. Vaginoplasties are much more effective. Finally, the cost of
phalloplasties is much greater, sometimes estimated as high as $150,000. See generally CLAUDINE
GRIOGS, S/HE: CHANGING SEX AND CHANGING CLOTHES 81-86 (1998) (discussing the relative
values of surgery).
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less of whether they take extraordinary steps to align their bodies with
masculinity. Since I rely on self-identification, neither surgery nor hor-
mone therapy are prerequisites to claiming the FTM label. I will not gen-
erally distinguish between pre- and post-op transsexuals, although where
the fact of surgery is relevant, I will mention it. I sometimes identify
FTMs as in transition or fully transitioned. Full transition does not de-
pend on the amount of surgery the FTM has completed. Again, I rely on
self-descriptions, so that a subject who claims to be fully transitioned
may or may not have had any surgery. Furthermore, my use of the cate-
gory FTM probably includes persons that others would label as transgen-
dered rather than transsexual.
Passing women present an analytical challenge as they are not easily
assigned to either the category FTM or butch lesbian. Passing women
were women who lived as men before there was any possibility for sur-
gical intervention. Some of these women might well identify as FTM
today, but there is no way to know for sure. Both FTMs and butch lesbi-
ans have claimed many of these women as part of their historical heri-
tage.' I include some of their stories in this article because, in whatever
category they fall, they certainly qualify as "differently gendered" and
their stories are "stories from the bottom."
I also include in my "gender garden" persons of either biological
sex who embrace both masculine and feminine gender identities. My
term for describing such people is that they are "radically androgynous."
On a gender continuum from masculine to feminine, they are not neces-
sarily at the center, the usual location under traditional notions of an-
drogyny. Such traditional notions of androgyny conjure up images of
unisex individuals, of persons who are neither male nor female. Such a
notion is what gave androgyny a bad name in the early stages of the sec-
ond wave of feminism.6' My concept of androgyny as a radical concept is
intended to embrace both ends of my imaginary continuum of gender. A
person's gender identity may be any place on the scale at any given time.
Some people may, throughout their lives, hover around one end of the
scale. Others may jump all over the place, sometimes expressing their
masculine identities and sometimes expressing their feminine ones.62
60. The slide show "She Even Chewed Tobacco" focuses on a number of such passing women
who have been claimed by the lesbian community and by the FrM community. For a textual
description of the show, see The San Francisco Lesbian and Gay History Project, "She Even Chewed
Tobacco": A Pictorial Narrative of Passing Women in America, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY:
RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 183 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989).
61. But see generally CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY
(1973) (presenting a feminist argument in favor of using the notion of androgyny to free individual
human development from the limits imposed by polarized concepts of sex and gender).
62. The radically androgynous would include the "men in skirts" that Mary Anne Case is
concerned about. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995). A good
contemporary example of a male who sometimes expresses female identity is gender-bender Dennis
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IV. STORIES FROM THE GENDER GARDEN
A. Stories from History
Throughout history there have been stories, real and fictional, of
women who have chosen to live as men, to wear men's clothing, to
"pass." Sometimes these women passed for short periods of time and
sometimes their biological sex was only discovered after death.63 Such
stories include the lives of so-called transvestite Saints,' the lives of
women who donned male clothing and fought for their countries as sol-
diers or sailors,' and the lives of women who chose male identities to
escape marriage or other female destinies.' Although the category trans-
sexual did not exist during these periods, some of these women undoubt-
edly would have classified themselves as FTMs if they had lived today.
1. Balkan "Sworn Virgins"
In the mountains of North Albania, close to the Yugoslavian border
of Montenegro, tribal societies continue to exist in which there are strict
hierarchies between men and women. 7 Women have few rights inde-
pendent of their fathers and husbands. A widow who has no surviving
son, for example, would not be allowed to maintain her own home. To
Rodman of the Chicago Bulls. An example of a female who sometimes expresses male identity is
k.d. lang.
63. See, e.g., JONATHAN NED KATz, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN
THE U.S.A. 232 (rev. ed. 1992) (telling the story of Murray Hall, a woman who posed as a man,
married twice, was active in New York City politics, and whose true sex was not discovered until
she died of breast cancer); Louis SULLIVAN, FROM FEMALE TO MALE: THE LIFE OF JACK BEE
GARLAND 8 (1990) (describing the headlines of the San Francisco Chronicle as proclaiming "'Jack
Bee' Was Woman" in 1936 when Garland died in a San Francisco hospital).
64. Joan of Arc is the most familiar of these Saints. But there are numerous others, including
Saint Thecla, who was a follower of Paul; Saint Margaret, who dressed as a man to escape her
arranged marriage; and Saint Uncumber who, when she prayed to be saved from marriage, became
physically able to grow a beard. See RUDOLF M. DEKKER & LOWrE C. VAN DE POL, THE TRADITION
OF FEMALE TRANSVESTISM IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 45-46 (1989). For a brief description of 34
female Saints who dressed or passed as men from the second to fifteenth centuries, see VALERIE R.
HOTCHKISS, CLOTHES MAKE THE MAN: FEMALE CROSS DRESSING IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 131-41
(1996).
65. See DEKKER & VAN DE POL, supra note 64. Their research uncovered 119 cases of females
who attempted to pass as men during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the Netherlands.
Many of these cases were discovered because the women had attempted to pass as soldiers or sailors
and their true sex was identified. Id.; see also KATZ, supra note 63, at 212-14 (telling the story of
Deborah Sampson, who dressed as a man and fought in the Revolutionary War).
66. See, e.g., CATALINA DE ERAUSO, LIEUTENANT NUN: MEMOIR OF A BASQUE
TRANSVESTITE IN THE NEW WORLD (Michele Stepto & Gabriel Stepto trans., Beacon Press 1996)
(telling the story of Lieutentant Nun, born in the Basque town of San Sebastian in 1585, who
escaped the convent at age 14 by donning male attire and sailing to the New World).
67. DEKKER & VAN DE POL, supra note 64, at 42; Mildred Dickemann, The Balkan Sworn
Virgin: A Traditional European Transperson, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 248; Rene
Gremaux, Woman Becomes Man in the Balkans, in THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL
DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY 241-46 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1994).
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escape this fate, a daughter in a family with no sons might choose to be-
come the "man" of the family. Alternatively, if a family had no male
heirs, the parents or grandparent might declare that a daughter too young
to make her own declaration would henceforth be raised as a boy. From
that point forward, the girlchild would dress as a man, carry weapons,
and perform the ritual acts reserved for men. In exchange for this recog-
nition of male privilege, the girl child would vow to remain unmarried
and chaste for the rest of her life.
Mikas Milicev Karadzic, by all accounts, was born female in the
late nineteenth century in the Balkans.' When she was quite young,
Milica (her female name) lost her father. He was killed in battle and her
mother, left with no male in the house, dressed Milica in male clothes
and renamed her Mikas. Mikas adopted his new gender identity readily
and grew into a man, acted as head of the household, and performed the
ritual and ceremonial acts assigned to men. He even voted as a man and
was accepted in his male role by the chieftains of the surrounding clans.
Although it appears that the male role was thrust upon him, probably
more by the grieving grandmother than the mother, Mikas apparently
grew into the role and refused to be known as female ever again. He be-
came a soldier, was referred to either as husband's brother or elderly
man, and was buried as a man in male attire. Regarding physical attrib-
utes, Mikas claimed to have menstruated for a short period at age 13, but
never again. Women who cared for Mikas in his old age said he had "ill-
developed breasts." He had no intimate relationships, although it is said
that he used to talk to other men about his lust for women.
Rene Gremaux has uncovered the case histories of 120 such women
who lived as men in the Balkans.' They were not true "passing women"
because they remained in their homes where the clanspeople knew that
they were born female. Yet, either by choice or by force of circumstance,
they took on the male role with the approval of male elders, usually at
puberty, and they remained in that role throughout their lives, even after
the necessity for being male had ended (e.g., after the widowed mother
had died).
2. Maria van Antwerpen
Maria van Antwerpen was born in Breda in 1719 and orphaned at
the age of 12.70 She worked as a maidservant for a while, and then in
1746 enlisted as a soldier under the name of Jan van Ant. One year later,
she officially married a woman who was not aware of Maria's true sex.
While stationed with her army unit in Breda in 1751, Maria was recog-
68. Mikas Milicev Karadzic's story is taken exclusively from Gremaux, supra note 67, at
246-53.
69. Id. at 242 (providing case histories for four of these individuals).
70. Maria van Antwerpen's story is taken exclusively from DEKKER & VAN DE POL, supra
note 64, at 3-4 and other scattered portions of their work.
13371998]
HeinOnline  -- 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1337 1997-1998
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
nized by a previous acquaintance and, thus, her disguise was discovered.
She was subsequently arrested and sentenced to a period of exile. Ten
years later, she again disguised herself as a man and married another
woman. She was arrested again in 1769. From the records of her arrests
and trials, we learn of her reasons for her decision to live as a man.
Maria argued that "God, Nature, and Fate had predestined her cross-
dressing."7 She claimed that she should have been and was expected to
be the seventh son of her parents. In her own words: "I take this as rule,
that no one can escape his predetermined fate. It is impossible to control
one's first passions."7 She said she was not like any other woman and
therefore it was best to dress in men's clothing. She also said she "was in
appearance a woman, but in nature a man."73
Many of these statements sound much like the statements of modem
FTM transsexuals. It is almost as though she was crying out, "I am a man
trapped in the body of a woman." In her autobiography, she explained
her feelings as follows: "It often made me wrathful that Mother Nature
treated me with so little compassion against my inclinations and the pas-
sions of my heart."74 It is reported that even when she dressed as a
woman, she wore male undergarments. She also reported that as a teen-
ager a "shaft shot out of her body""5 when she menstruated, thereby
claiming a biological cause for her actions. She was medically examined
and found to be female.
3. Thomas or Thomasina Hall
The story of Thomas or Thomasina Hall is derived from court rec-
ords in 1629 Virginia. 6 Hall was brought before the court because he/she
sometimes dressed as a woman and sometimes as a man. Although never
charged with a crime, Hall had been reported to the authorities because
villagers were confused as to whether Hall was a he or a she. Hall was
born female according to the English records of her birth. She moved to
the New World as an indentured servant in male attire, claiming male
identity. But after settling in Virginia, he sometimes reverted to female
clothes and female identity. The women appointed by the court to deter-
mine whether Hall was female searched him and found him to be male.
Others were not convinced, so Hall was inspected again-this time by
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Thomas or Thomasina Hall's story is taken from MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING
MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 183-88
(1996), and Hasan Shafiqullah, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An Argument for the
Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 195, 198 (1997).
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men and women. The women agreed again that Hall was male, but the
men were divided.
The court ultimately appears to have accepted Hall's self-
description as male and agreed to refer to him as "he." Yet, at the same
time, the court pronounced him both male and female and ordered him to
wear female headgear and an apron over his male attire as, one might
surmise, an outward expression of his dual status. It is unfortunate that
we do not have any verified first person accounts by Hall himself. It is
also unfortunate that court records were burned during the Civil War,
making it impossible to further trace Hall's history. It seems that his sex
may have been physically ambiguous and that his gender was mixed.
The time and effort the community committed to determining the
correct category for Hall-male or female-is consistent with society's
reluctance to accept the possibility of both categories in the same person.
Their actions reflect their understanding that male and female are polar
extremes-for both sex and gender. Hall could be one or the other but
not both. The amazing ending to the story is that the court's action is
consistent with a recognition that Hall was both. It is not clear that the
community embraced the court's determination, but it does seem that a
determination by the court was needed to end the conflict. Thus, there
was a legal solution to the dilemma and Hall was legally assigned to a
special category that had not existed before.
4. Passing Women
Jack Bee Garland died in 1936 after living as a man for 40 years.77
Garland had been born in San Francisco in 1869 as Elvira Virginia Mug-
arrieta, the daughter of San Francisco's first Mexican consul. Her sister
reported that Garland had dressed as a man for numerous reasons in-
cluding: creating the opportunity to visit the Spanish-American war front
in the Philippines in 1899, because it fit her/his style, and because it en-
abled Garland to help the down-and-outers on the streets of San Fran-
cisco. Before moving to San Francisco and passing as a man, Garland
lived in Stockton and used the name Babe Bean. In Stockton, her sex was
publicly questioned and she seems to have intentionally maintained an
ambiguous gender identity, straddling male and female. She was often
referred to in the local press as a woman in male attire, but the newspa-
per also maintained the mystery by continuing to question whether she
was male or female.78
There is no evidence that Garland passed as a man to enable him to
maintain sexual or romantic relationships with women. His biographer,
Louis Sullivan, claims Garland was a true FTM, who embraced a mas-
77. Jack Bee Garland's story is taken exclusively from SULLIVAN, supra note 63.
78. Id. at 31 (quoting from the local newspaper that "[tihe mystery is still unsolved as to
whether 'Babe' Bean is a boy or girl, a man or a woman").
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culine identity "in order to be a man among men."' 9 Sullivan quotes from
Garland's memoirs:
Many have thought it strange that I do not care to mingle with
women of my own age, and seem partial to men's company. Well, is
it not natural that I should prefer the companionship of men? I am
never happy nor contented unless with a few of "the boys." They talk
and act naturally-without the conceit or affectations so often prac-
ticed in the drawing-rooms. Could women see men as I have, they
would love them all.8°
Dorothy Lucille Tipton was born female in 1914.81 In the early
1930s, she began the transformation process which established her new
identity as Billy Tipton, jazz musician. Billy died in 1989 at the age of
74. His three adopted sons and several of his five wives expressed as-
tonishment at the revelation of Tipton' s biological sex after death. Tipton
never had surgery or hormone treatment, but nonetheless passed as a
male for over forty years, a feat all the more remarkable given his life-
time of travelling in close quarters with other musicians. He bound his
chest, used a prosthesis, and claimed his privacy as protection against
discovery. His mother stayed in touch with him until her death in 1971,
but never revealed Tipton's gender to his wives or children. Because
Tipton left us no personal insight into his choices, we are left to guess the
reasons. Some surmise that the explanation lies in the fact that maleness
was a prerequisite for the vocation that Billy chose, jazz musician. At the
same time, Billy rejected jobs that would have led to greater renown in
the music world, apparently concerned that too much fame would subject
him to the risk of being discovered female. Late in life, when he needed
medical care, which he also rejected for fear of discovery, he explained
to visiting cousins that he could not be truthful about his sex because
transsexualism and cross-dressing were against the law and he feared
arrest. Billy Tipton lived in constant fear of being "found out." He con-
fided to his cousin Madeline, " Some people might think I'm a freak or a
hermaphrodite. I'm not. I'm a normal person. This has been my
choice.""2
Unlike Jack Bee Garland, Billy Tipton had sexual relationships with
women, several of whom he "married." Although Billy's first involve-
ment was with a woman whom many labeled lesbian, Billy's lifetime
choice to live as a man did not seem to be motivated primarily by a de-
sire to be sexually involved with women. In fact, according to his last
wife, Kitty, she and Billy had no intimate sexual relationship. Nonethe-
79. Id. at 4.
80. Id.
81. A recently published full-length biography of Billy Tipton tells the full story of this
remarkable life. See DIANE WOOD MIDDLEBROOK, SUITS ME: THE DOUBLE LIFE OF BILLY TIPrON
(1998).
82. Id. at 278.
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less they were married for 18 years. They finally divorced over problems
they had in raising their three adopted sons. After a major argument,
Billy took the side of the children against his wife, and moved out of the
family home with his sons.83 Playing husband and father were central
aspects of Billy's overall identity as male. The roles do not appear to be a
cover for a lesbian relationship.
By contrast, many passing women live as men in large part to en-
able pursuit of romantic or sexual relationships with other women. Al-
berta Lucille Hart appears to have been such a woman. Her story is re-
ported in some detail by a Portland, Oregon psychiatrist whom she con-
sulted in 1918." The story includes a number of incidents of deep emo-
tional attachments to other females as she was growing up, coupled with
fairly explicit "daydreams" about being with these women as a husband
or boyfriend. She was an intelligent and industrious student, who went to
Stanford medical school and became a doctor. The psychiatrist diagnosed
her as homosexual, and for a while engaged in treatments (e.g., hypnosis)
aimed at correcting that "problem." The patient, however, became con-
cerned that any such treatment might diminish her masculine identity.
"She had an utter loathing of the female type of mind."85
The patient's solution was to ask for her doctor's assistance in ena-
bling her to live as a man, which was in conformity with her true nature.
The doctor appears to have required more than psychological evidence of
masculinity before agreeing to this proposal. He physically examined her
and found "deviations sufficiently marked to attract attention."' He noted
an enlarged clitoris, but gave no details. He also found that her breasts
and hips were clearly female, but smaller than normal. Hart requested
surgical removal of her uterus, in part to help her pass as male since
menstruation was occurring. A hysterectomy was performed, she cut her
hair, and assumed a male identity. She married a woman and practiced
her profession, medicine, in a neighboring state. The psychiatrist con-
cluded in his notes of the case:
If society will but let her alone, she will fill her niche in the
world and leave it better for her bravery in meeting the issue on the
merits of the case as best she knew. Instead of criticism and hound-
ing, she needs and deserves the respect and sympathy of society,
which is responsible for her existence as she is.1
7
If being transsexual means desiring surgery to help one's gender
identity more readily conform to one's body, then Hart should qualify.
83. Id. at 252-59.
84. Alberta Lucille Hart's story is taken exclusively from Allen J. Gilbert, Homosexuality and
its Treatment, 52 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIsEASE 297 (1920), reprinted in KArZ, supra note 63, at
258.
85. Id. at 275.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 277.
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The requested surgery, a hysterectomy, was requested for purposes of
enabling her body to conform to her own idea of herself as male. But
Hart also requested the surgery to assure that she would not have chil-
dren. Somewhere along the line, someone had convinced her that her
relations with women were deviant and she seems to have thought this
judgment meant she should not have children. Whether Hart would have
been a transsexual man or a butch lesbian in today's culture is unclear,
but she was clearly differently gendered in her own time. Her psychiatrist
seems to have been won over by her strength of character and will. Liv-
ing as a man was her choice and it seemed the best solution, given her
determination to practice medicine and to be intimate with women.
B. Modem Stories
The stories that follow are stories told by FTMs in their own words,
either in autobiographies, or in articles, or as reported by social scientists
who have interviewed subjects. I have grouped the stories according to
some common themes that emerge.
1. "I am biologically male."
In the 1950s transsexualism gained its first modem hero in the form
of Christine Jorgensen, a man who became a woman.88 Others followed
and their autobiographies engaged audiences around the world. Jan Mor-
ris, who was professional writer, wrote her own autobiography when she
became a woman. 9 The story of Ren6e Richards,' a male to female who
gained fame from her legal battle to play women's tennis, is probably
familiar to many Americans, especially since the story was made into a
made-for-TV movie, Second Serve." Autobiographies by FTMs are less
well known and less common.
a. The Story of Mario Martino
The earliest first person full-length autobiography appears to be that
of Mario Martino, published in 1977 under the title Emergence." The
autobiography contains no specific dates, but from the story I conclude
that Mario, who grew up as Marie, was probably reaching puberty at
about the time the Jorgensen story broke in 1953. That would make
Mario about 55 years old if he is alive today.
88. See CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, CHRISTINE JORGENSEN REVEALS (J Records 1953) (sound
recording); see also CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, CHRISTINE JORGENSEN: A PERSONAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1968).
89. JAN MORRIS, CONUNDRUM (1974).
90. REN E RICHARDS, SECOND SERVE: THE RENIE RICHARDS STORY (1983).
91. SECOND SERVE (Lorimar-Telepictures 1986).
92. MARIO MARTINO WITH HARRIETr, EMERGENCE: A TRANSSEXUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1977). Mario's story is taken exclusively from this source.
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Marie was raised Catholic in an Italian-American family. She went
to a convent school where she fell in love with and had some minor
physical relationships with other girls-which of course were discovered
by the nuns and for which she was often expelled. She trained to be a
nurse at a Catholic hospital and, as a novitiate, was known as Sister Mary
Dominick. She left the convent at age 25, but continued her nursing ca-
reer and her relationships with women. She had never been with a man.
Marie claimed that she didn't know until age nine that she wasn't a
boy. Shortly after she left the convent she and some friends at the hospi-
tal were running urine tests on themselves to check hormone levels.
Marie's test was consistent with the hormones of a seventeen-year-old
boy. She was elated. Her sense of herself as male had been confirmed by
physical evidence.
She writes in the preface to her book:
My life was a series of distorted mirrors. I saw myself in their crazy
reflections false to the image I had of myself. I was a boy! I felt like one,
I dressed like one, I fought like one. Later, I was to love like one.
Unless you have actually experienced transsexualism, you cannot
conceive of the trauma of being cast in the wrong body. It is the impris-
onment of body and of soul...."
The most important event in her life as Marie (other than the dis-
covery that her urine test could have been mistaken for a male's) was her
relationship with Becky. While Becky maintained initial reservations
against Marie's decision to become Mario, they overcame these difficul-
ties. Becky, also a nurse, attended Mario during his recuperation. The
most important event in Mario's life was his marriage to Becky.
The marriage was not an easy event to plan. They wanted to be mar-
ried in the Church by a priest and they found one who was supportive.
Mario's birth certificate had been changed to male and his nursing li-
cense had been changed as well. But now he had to deal with his home-
town priest in order to acquire his baptismal certificate. Here the trouble
began. The hometown priest refused to cooperate, the supportive priest
could not be available at a later date, and the new priest who initially
agreed to do the marriage did not know Mario's story. When a co-worker
called the new priest and explained Mario's situation, the new priest
telephoned Mario, called him a "despicable thing" who submitted to sur-
gery for "immoral purposes," and cancelled the wedding ceremony.'
With the help of friends, a Methodist minister agreed to substitute. Mario
says of himself now: "Legally male, a happily married husband, I ask
only to be accepted now as an average man.""
93. Id. at xi-xii.
94. Id. at 227.
95. Id. at xi.
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Marie's life was filled with disasters and, once she was in transition,
her status as an outcast brought even more disasters. Even though he was
a good nurse, Mario was ostracized by the other nurses as he was going
through the process of becoming Mario. Mario's co-workers had a harder
time dealing with the transition period than with the final outcome. They
could not deal with that "in between" stage of his being part male and
part female. And yet, for Mario, that had been the problem all along:
being part male and part female. The transition made Mario whole,
bringing his maleness to the fore.
b. The Story of Lynn Edward Harris
Lynn Edward Harris was born in California with combined male
and female sex characteristics.' At birth, the genitalia appeared ambigu-
ous, causing her parents and doctor to arbitrarily designate her as female.
Outward manifestations of male characteristics, including the develop-
ment of a budding penis at age five, a lowering of the voice between ages
eleven and thirteen, and the need to shave daily by age fifteen, as well as
internal questions of gender identity prompted Lynn to seek answers
from the medical profession-but a doctor failed to even acknowledge
her questions. Her mother refused to recognize the problem and insisted
it was all mental. At age twenty-three, Lynn checked herself into a hos-
pital for analysis and the congenital anomaly was discovered. Because
she had been raised as a woman, Lynn continued to adopt female attire-
but it never felt right to her. At the same time, she had no interest in go-
ing through surgery to change her body.
Finally, a friend suggested that she simply embrace a male identity.
To do so, she began dressing as a man and stopped shaving. Then she
requested a legal name change, changing her middle name to the male
name "Edward." She also requested a new birth certificate that would
show her sex as male. Harris made these requests in a court petition,
fully aware of the California statute that required her to undergo surgical
treatment before a new birth certificate would be issued indicating a new
sex.9" The California statute did not contemplate, as some other states do,
that the sex may have been designated incorrectly at birth.98
96. Lynn Edward Harris's story is taken exclusively from Lynn Edward Harris, A Legal Path
of Androgyny, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 495.
97. California's Health and Safety Code states:
Whenever a person born in this state has undergone surgical treatment for the purpose of
altering his or her sexual characteristics to those of the opposite sex, a new birth
certificate may be prepared for the person reflecting the change of gender and any change
of name accomplished by an order of a court of this state ....
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 1996).
98. For example, Hawaii expressly addresses the problem of incorrect designation by allowing
a change in sex designation on a birth certificate if:
(4) Upon receipt of an affidavit of a physician that the physician has examined the birth
registrant and has determined the following:
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Harris argued before the court that her sex was male and that the
birth certificate was a fraud. She/he requested a legal remedy for the
"ambiguity, lack of continuity and presumed fraudulence associated with
my present gender status. '"" The petition was granted although it is un-
clear from Harris's account whether the judge ruled only on the name
change or both the name change and sex change.
At any rate, presuming that he now had the power of the court deci-
sion on his side, Harris wrote to the Department of Vital Statistics, re-
questing a new birth certificate. The Department of Vital Statistics sent
back a "new" certificate with the "new" name, but the sex indicated on
the certificate remained female. When Harris complained, the Depart-
ment sent a copy of the California statute. Harris countered with the ar-
gument that the statute only applied in cases where a person changed
from one sex to the opposite sex and since he was both male and female
he could not identify what "opposite sex" could mean in his case. Thus,
the statute simply did not apply to him. Furthermore, there was no gen-
eral requirement that one go through surgery in order to correct the sex
on a birth certificate. Finally the Department relented and issued a new
certificate indicating that his sex was male.
Harris describes his legal victory as follows:
Justice was done. To win as I did, having both the facts and the
law on my side, was an ultimate victory .... The court in its wisdom
had profoundly empowered and enabled me to actualize my potential
and destiny with authenticity as I, a true hermaphrodite, am living life
and perceiving it.'&°
It is easy to understand the sense of victory in having one's claimed
identity recognized by a court without having to jump through the sur-
gery hoop required by the statute. But one can only ask: How much of a
victory is it and how authentic is it to live within the category "male" if
one is really both male and female?
c. Other Stories
Holly Devor's recent study of FTMs uncovered some cases of indi-
viduals who had been designated female, but who, when surgery was
finally performed, turned out to have some male characteristics in their
reproductive systems."' Devor questions whether it is appropriate to call
(A) The birth registrant's sex designation was entered incorrectly on the birth
registrant's birth certificate; or
(B) The birth registrant has had a sex change operation and the sex designation on
the birth registrant's birth certificate is no longer correct; provided that the director of
health may further investigate and require additional information that the director deems
necessary....
HAW. REv. STAT. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(A), (B) (1993).
99. Harris, supra note 96, at 499.
100. Id. at 502.
101. See DEVOR, supra note 59, at 405.
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these persons FTMs or whether they belong in a different sex/gender
category altogether.
0 2
Aaron, one of her subjects, calls his sex ambiguous, and says of
FTMs: "How can they stop being female if they never been? They can
stop looking female. They can stop acting female .... But they can't
stop being something they've never been."'' 3 Peter, another of her sub-
jects, also denies ever having been female:
I don't think that I ever thought that I truly was [female] but, at some
point in time, I said you're not even going to get to call me this....
I'm getting to the point where I hate the word "transsexual." It's a la-
bel, and I don't like it. I also don't like "F-to-M." It implies that there
really was something else that I don't really feel .... 04
2. "I am a man, not a lesbian."
Many FTMs have lived some part of their lives as lesbians, even
embracing the label lesbian. Since FTMs are usually attracted to women,
they have much in common with lesbians and find lesbian communities
offer some solace and opportunity to be who they are. Nonetheless,
FTMs maintain their differences from lesbians, sometimes to the verge
of appearing homophobic.
At a meeting of FTM International, 0 5 a member explains how he
chose to tell his father about his transition: "I told him, 'The good news
is, I'm not a lesbian. ' t 6
Other accounts echo this sense of difference.
When I got involved with gay women and found out how frigging
different I was it was obvious. Up until that point I thought that other
gay females were the same as me, they wanted to be male. And when
I found out that was not true that no matter how masculine they acted,
they had female identities, I realized I didn't quite fit in here, but I fit
in closer here than I ever had.'07
I knew about lesbians but it just didn't occur to me that's what it
was.... What I knew about lesbians was that two women can be to-
gether and it's okay if they are lesbian. . .. It was something they did
on the coast in the big cities, more liberal people did. I just didn't
consider myself that liberal, that open minded .... To get into being
102. Id.
103. Id. at 449 (statement of Aaron).
104. Id. at 448 (first and second alterations in original) (statement of Peter).
105. FIM International is a San-Francisco based education and support group. The group
includes around a thousand members who range from FrMs who are only taking hormones to those
who have completely transitioned with the help of surgery. See FrM International Homepage
(visited Nov. 21, 1998) <http://www.ftm-intl.org>.
106. David Tuller, A Self-Made Man, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 1997, at Z1.
107. GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 96 (statement of Aaron).
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a lesbian, like, you have to march for things and you gotta go to cau-
cuses, you gotta hate men, you gotta dress butch, and you gotta get in
to all that stuff, and I didn't want to do that. I didn't want to get into
all that stuff."8
James Green, a fully transitioned FTM and president of F1TM Inter-
national, describes his relationship with the lesbian community during
the time he was still a woman: "I was excluded from lesbian events even
before I started the transition. I was just too male-not butch but male. I
crossed some line somehow, and everyone, the other women, felt that
there were things about me, despite my female body, that were just not
female. , ,lca
Another transitioned FTM says:
I thought, Well, maybe I'm a lesbian. Could be-I know I'm attracted
to women. I went to consciousness-raising meetings, and I'd listen
and feel like a fraud. One girl said, "What makes each of us feel like a
real woman?" And while they went around the room answering, I
thought, Nothing-absolutely nothing on earth makes me feel like a
woman.
I'm just a plain old heterosexual man.... I'm not a professional
transsexual. I don't think of myself as a transsexual anymore. I was
one, I made that transition, now I'm just a man.''°
Tony Barreto-Neto stated: "People may have seen me as a lesbian,
but, in my mind, I was a straight, heterosexual man.""'
In a letter to Dr. Lothstein, Barbara L. writes:
I was asked to leave college because they thought I was gay. I
never even became involved with anyone, but because I was attracted
to women, they believed I was. I know I am not a latent homosexual
or a transvestite, but a transsexual. I feel male and I am."
2
In his autobiography, Emergence, Mario Martino tells of his rela-
tionship with Becky, pre-transition, when Mario was Marie. Love be-
tween two women was initially difficult for Becky, probably in large part
due to her Catholic upbringing. Although Marie insists that she always
thought of herself as male, this claim became stronger in response to
Becky's misgivings about lesbianism. Marie says to Becky: "[Y]ou and I
are not lesbians. We relate as man to woman, woman to man.""3 Then
108. Id. at 95 (alterations in original) (statement of Stan).
109. Amy Bloom, The Body Lies, NEW YORKER, July 18, 1994, at 41.
110. Id. at 49 (quoting "Michael," a transitioned FTM).
111. Paulo Lima, Cop Beats Sex-Change Backlash, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 20, 1996, at I (reporting
on Tony Barreto-Neto, a fully transitioned FIM who is a sheriffs deputy in Hillsborough County,
Florida).
112. LOTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 1.
113. Id. at 132.
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Marie further rationalizes: "Any resemblance to lesbianism on our part
was due to my lack of the proper organs. Never did I use my vagina
during lovemaking-always I attached and wore my false penis.""'
The rejection of the lesbian label can be explained in several differ-
ent ways. It would not, for example, be in the least surprising to discover
that society's homophobic attitudes have permeated even the lives of the
differently gendered. In addition, for any female who is male identified
and desirous of either hormone treatment or surgery, rejection of homo-
sexual identity is necessary. The clinics and professionals that act as
gatekeepers to the availability of medical treatment have clearly con-
structed case profiles which applicants are expected to fit."' Several
scholars, most recently Bernice Hausmann in her controversial book,
Changing Sex, have argued that transsexuals know more about the medi-
cal condition known as Gender Identity Disorder than most doctors."'
Transsexuals"' must convince their doctors that they are entitled to such
surgery."' Doctors determine suitability based on psychological testing
and interviews. Transsexuals who wish to qualify for surgery learn how
to tell their stories so that they will fit the requisite profiles."9
From my reading of the literature, the insistent rejection of homo-
sexual desires and the distancing of one's self from gay identity appears
more prevalent in the MTF population than in the FTM population.
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Many
FTMs identify as male or transgendered without ever having surgery.
Hormone therapy may be sufficient. If this is true, then the FTM popula-
tion is less dependent on the medical profession and less likely to medi-
ate their stories with an eye toward claiming the right to surgery.
Nonetheless, stories abound from FTMs who distance themselves
after transition from their previous lesbian identities. Yet, this is not al-
114. Id. at 134.
115. See BENJAMIN STANDARDS §§ 4.1.1-4.11.1, 5.1-5.2.4, reprinted in GENDER BLENDING,
supra note 58, at 505-20; see also Rubin, supra note 54, at 476 (arguing that, especially in the past,
transsexuals "had to be able to persuade a number of professions that they were determined to be
completely 'normal' members of the target sex").
116. See, e.g., HAtSMAN, supra note 57, at 110-40 (discussing the role of transsexuals in the
diagnosis of gender identity disorders and arguing that the role of the doctor is essentially
mechanical in nature).
117. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines transsexualism as:
The essential features of this disorder are a persistent discomfort and sense of
inappropriateness about one's assigned sex in a person who has reached puberty. In
addition, there is persistent preoccupation, for at least two years, with getting rid of one's
primary and secondary sex characteristics and acquiring the sex characteristics of the
other sex .... Invariably there is the will to live as a member of the other sex.
Id. at 2 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 74 (3d ed. 1987)).
118. Id. at 143.
119. Id.
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ways the case. Bruce, one of the subjects in Holly Devor's study, retains
a strong attachment to his previous lesbian identity:
I'm a lesbian man.... I'm very committed to the lesbian movement.
I'm very committed to women. And to their struggle in this life. I just
happened to be born with tits .... But I can't have tits .... I never
used to look in the mirror. Now I shave every day.... I would like to
be able to not have to be a man. I would like to be able to be a lesbian
without tits. But I can't. °20
3. "People think I am male and it is dangerous for me if they find
out I am female."
a. Brandon Teena
Brandon Teena, born female but passing as a male, made quite a hit
with a number of females.'2 ' Once discovered to be a she by her lovers,
Brandon represented to her lovers that she was a pre-op transsexual and
that she would have surgery as soon as she could afford it. Some of these
lovers still refuse to admit that Brandon was female. After moving from
Lincoln, Nebraska to a smaller, less tolerant town in Nebraska, Brandon
started a relationship with another young female. The people in the town
thought Brandon was male. When her anatomical sex was discovered by
two males she had hung out with, their response was to rape and beat her.
Within a week Brandon was dead and the two males arrested for murder.
Brandon's story has struck a strong chord with the transgendered
community, especially with young FTMs who identify with Brandon's
attempt to pass as male. Brandon had fought for inclusion in the local
community as male. The fact that he was murdered by two males, mem-
bers of the gender group he wished to join, strikes some as a particularly
unsettling betrayal. Also, it is unclear whether Brandon's female anat-
omy would have been discovered had he not been arrested by the local
police, who, once they had discovered his anatomical gender, "outed"
him to members of the local community.' Thus, there is also a betrayal
by public servants who are entrusted with protecting the vulnerable from
harm. Transgender activists have rallied for an investigation into the re-
sponsibility of the local police in contributing to Brandon's murder and
for possible infringements of his civil rights.'
120. DEVOR, supra note 59, at 448 (statement of Bruce).
121. For a thorough account of the story of Brandon Teena, see Roger Worthington, Deadly
Deception: Teena Brandon's Double LUfe May Have Led to a Triple Murder, CH. TRIB., Jan. 17,
1994, Tempo, at 1.
122. Davina Anne Gabriel, Background of the Murder of Brandon Teena (visited Oct. 12,
1998) <http://www.ftm-intl.org/ftmNews/Bran/bran.bkgr.html>. A documentary film based on
Brandon's story won the Teddy for best documentary at the 1998 Berlin Film Festival. THE
BRANDON TEENA STORY (Bless-Bless Prods. 1998) (Susan Muska & Greta Olafsdottir, filmmakers).
123. Gabriel, supra note 122.
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b. Leslie Feinberg"
When I say I am a gender outlaw in modem society, it's not rheto-
ric. I have been dragged out of bars by police who claimed I broke the
law when I dressed myself that evening. I've heard the rap of a cop's
club on the stall door when I've used a public women's toilet. And
then there's the question of my identity papers.
My driver's license reads Male. The application form only offered
me two choices: M or F. In this society, where women are assumed to
be feminine and men are assumed to be masculine, my sex and gen-
der expression appear to be at odds. But the very fact that I could be
issued a license as a male demonstrates that many strangers "read
me" as a man, rather than a masculine woman.
In almost thirty years of driving I've heard the whine of police si-
rens behind my car on only three occasions. But each time, a trooper
sauntered up to my car window and demanded, "Your license and
registration-sir." Imagine the nightmare I'd face if I handed the
trooper a license that says I am female. The alleged traffic infraction
should be the issue, not my genitals. I shouldn't have to prove my sex
to any police officer who has stopped me for a moving violation, and
my body should not be the focus of investigation. But in order to
avoid these dangers, I broke the law when I filled out my driver's li-
cense application. As a result, I could face a fine, a suspension of my
license, and up to six months in jail merely for having put an M in the
box marked sex.
And then there's the problem of my passport. I don't feel safe
traveling with a passport that reads Female. However, if I apply for a
passport as Male, I am subject to... felony charges."l
4. "I am a third sex."
Many transsexuals want more than anything to pass in the role of
the opposite sex. If they identify as transsexual at all, they do so pre-op
or during transition. However, with the growth of the transgender move-
ment, more individuals are embracing their transsexual or transgender
identities.'26
FTM and MTF transsexuals often embrace both their maleness and
femaleness and express a longing to be identified as both, rather than
124. LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO
RUPAUL 61 (1996). The following section excerpts a portion of Feinberg's book.
125. Anyone who knowingly makes a false statement in an application for a passport violates
federal law and is subject to a fine, imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
126. In a recent survey, admittedly skewed towards people who are more likely to be open
about their transsexuality, over half of the respondents self-identified as transsexual and over ten
percent identified as transgenders. See Dallas Denny & Jan Roberts, Results of a Questionnaire on
the Stanards of Care of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, in
GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 326, 327 tbl. 1.
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either/or.'27 Kate Bornstein, by contrast, an MTF, expresses a desire to be
neither as opposed to one or the other: "I know I'm not a man-about
that much I'm very clear, and I've come to the conclusion that I'm
probably not a woman either ... ""
Many of the FTMs in Holly Devor's study express dual identities
that embrace both femaleness and maleness.'29 Bruce, for example, says:
"So I feel like I'm a third gender.""'3 He hopes for the day when it will be
okay to have both male and female identities in the same person. But for
now, "I have to be a transsexual man because there is no place for me as
a third gender."'3 '
Thirty-three percent of the FTMs in Devor's study said that they
believed transsexual people went through a stage of being both male and
female.' Many of them said that they retained some of the feminine part
of themselves even after they had transitioned.'33 But the transition proc-
ess is a slow one, not something that occurs overnight. And it is in this
slow transition that transsexuals learn how to be both male and female.
Bill, for example, says: "One can be both a man and a woman. I think
most transsexuals experience this state in some part of transition .... I
think it is accomplished through an acceptance of ambiguity, or role
flexibility.... I have been and still am both."'"M
And Bruce, another Devor FTM, says:
I've been growing into becoming a man. I didn't just all of a sudden
decide to be one .... There's a whole personality change that takes
place. There's a bonding that takes place with men .....
... An F to M stops being a woman when they deny who they
are. See, I think the reality is, you are bom physically a woman. You
come into the world as a woman .. .and I think that you need to
come to terms with that part of you, and then move on .... I don't
think I'll ever stop being a woman."'
127. For a discussion of this point, see PAT CALIFtA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSGENDERISM, at ch. 8 (1997).
128. KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF Us 8 (1994);
see also CALIFIA, supra note 127, at 245-77.
129. See DEVOR, supra note 59, at 447-58.
130. Id. at 448 (statement of Bruce).
131. Id.
132. Id. at456.
133. Id. at 457 ("I have been and still am both.... [But] I am only comfortable with myself as
having female components since I have fully lived and expressed myself as a male .... (alterations
in original) (statement of Bill)).
134. Id. at 457 (statement of Bill).
135. Id. at 457 (first, second, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (statement of Bruce).
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V. SOME OBSERVATIONS
There is no single identifiable meta-narrative for persons who iden-
tify as FTMs. Nor do all aspects of the alleged meta-FTM narrative con-
structed by medical professionals apply only to FTMs. Butch lesbians
share childhood experiences that are similar to FTMs. Butch lesbians
identify with male heroes, embrace athletics, and are active tomboys.
Butch lesbians may pass as men, not on a permanent basis, but for eco-
nomic or safety reasons.'36 Butch lesbians are female, even though they
may temporarily embrace masculine identities or attributes.
Some FTMs, even after hormones and therapy, embrace the female
part of themselves. Those that do not, remain cognizant of the female-
ness of their bodies. A female who has become a male may still retain
female sexual organs.'37 Furthermore, although many FTMs elect "top"
surgery, very few elect "bottom" or genital reconstructive surgery.
Probably more frequently than MTFs, FTMs live with bodies that exhibit
some maleness and some femaleness.
The laws of each state vary regarding legal change of sex on birth
certificates.' In many states, however, the sex on one's driver's license
is determined by the applicant's self-identification. Thus it is possible for
the same person to be identified as female on one document and male on
another.
In order to obtain sex reassignment surgery, the Benjamin Standards
require that the applicant live successfully in the role of the desired sex
for at least one year.'39 Thus, the medical profession requires anatomical
females to pass as males before their bodies can be surgically altered to
fit their male identities. During this period of transition, transsexuals live
in an "in-between state" that is part male and part female.
After transition, some FTMs continue to embrace their prior female
identities. Some FTMs identify as transsexual, which means that they
acknowledge their prior lives as females. Even though able to pass suc-
cessfully as men, these people are unwilling to forsake the reality of their
lives as women. The integrity of such self-identification and the respon-
136. See KATH WESTON, RENDER ME, GENDER ME: LESBIANS TALK SEX, CLASS, COLOR,
NATION, STUDMUFFINS... 80-81 (1996) (essay based upon an interview with Jeanne Riley).
137. See, e.g., DEVOR, supra note 59, at 472 (statement of Ken).
138. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 1996) (requiring petition to
superior court for issuance of a new birth certificate after surgical sex change), with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 130A- 118 (1997) (requiring written request to State Registrar accompanied by notarized
statement of physician that individual underwent sex reassignment surgery), with N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 4138 (McKinney 1985) (not addressing sex change as a basis for birth certificate alteration),
with TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203 (1996) (expressly denying amendments to birth certificates
because of sex change surgery).
139. BENJAMIN STANDARDS § 4.9.1 Standard 9, reprinted in GENDER BLENDING, supra note
58, at 515 ("Genital sex reassignment shall be preceded by a period of at least twelve months during
which time the patient lives full-time in the social role of the genetically other sex.").
[Vol. 75:41352
HeinOnline  -- 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1352 1997-1998
TRANSSEXUALS & ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
sibility for a continuous sense of self in the world are values worth pro-
tecting, both for the individual and for the society with which the indi-
vidual interacts. The only way to become one sex is to deny the reality of
the prior life.
These observations are intended to emphasize that it is difficult and,
perhaps, undesirable for transsexuals to become one sex by eliminating
all traces of the other sex. Also, they are intended to call into question the
bipolarization of sex and gender identity, which requires that we view a
single individual as belonging for all time at one bipolar extreme to the
exclusion of the other.
VI. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS: DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX
A. Current Status: Legal Protections in the Workplace for Transsexuals
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of
sex." State laws modeled on Title VII contain similar prohibitions."'
None of these laws specifically include or exclude transsexuals.' 2 Mu-
nicipal laws add additional protections against workplace discrimination.
Some of these laws include discrimination against transsexuals, either
under court interpretations of the word "sex"'' 3 or because they have been
amended to include transsexuals as a protected class.'"
140. In addressing employer practices, Title VII states:
-It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
141. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.22. (Michie 1996); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463
(West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303
(1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1989).
142. But note that Minnesota's Human Rights law, adding sexual orientation as a protected
category, specifically included protection for transsexuals as well. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (1996)
(defining "sexual orientation" to include "having or being perceived as having a self-image or
identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness"). It is unique in
that regard. See also Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 Wt 737215, at *8-*9
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (holding that New York State human rights law prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex includes discrimination against transsexuals).
143. See, e.g., Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding
that a FIM transsexual fell within the protections of New York City's regulatory prohibitions
against discrimination based on sex).
144. See, e.g., IOWA CrTY, IOWA, REV. ORDINANCES 95-3697 (outlawing discrimination on the
basis of "gender identity" which is defined as "a person's various individual attributes as they are
understood to be masculine and/or feminine").
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Early litigation by transsexuals claiming protection under Title VII
resulted in a series of court holdings in which the term "sex" was inter-
preted to exclude transsexuals. Some courts reasoned that the word "sex"
includes male and female, but not transsexuals who were both.' 5 Others
reasoned that employers who discriminated against transsexuals were
discriminating not because of the plaintiffs sex, but because of the
plaintiffs decision to change sex.'" Still another held more simply that
discrimination against someone who was a transsexual simply did not
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex, but rather on the basis of
transsexualism.
14 7
Every court that has considered whether Title VII should cover dis-
crimination against a transsexual qua transsexual has decided the issue
against such an interpretation of the statute.' 8 One recent case, however,
indicates that transsexuals are not completely omitted from Title VII. In
Miles v. New York University,' 9 the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment
by a male professor, claiming that he harassed her because she was a
woman.' The court held that the plaintiff's claim could not be dismissed
on the basis that she was a transsexual, rather than a biological, female.'5'
One wonders, however, whether an alternative defense, "I sexually har-
assed her because transsexuals turn me on," would survive a motion to
dismiss quite as readily. Since all courts have agreed that discrimination
against transsexuals qua transsexuals is not covered, it is only a short
step away to find that harassment against transsexuals qua transsexuals is
similarly not covered.
In sum, there is virtually no protection under Title VII for transsexu-
als who transition on the job, or for transsexuals who fail to pass after
transition, or for transsexuals who identify as transgendered rather than
as male or female.
145. See, e.g., Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 473-74 (Iowa 1983).
146. See, e.g., Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 975 WL 302, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975).
147. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
148. See Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 W 737215, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 24, 1996) ("Every federal court that has considered the question has rejected the application of
[Title VII] to a transsexual claiming employment discrimination."). But note that the federal district
court in Ulane did rule in favor of the transsexual plaintiff. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581
F. Supp. 821, 839-40 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
149. 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
150. Miles, 979 F. Supp. at 249. The case was brought under Title IX, which prevents
discrimination "on the basis of sex" in the context of educational programs or activities that receive
federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). However, the court noted that the Title
IX "on the basis of sex" term should be interpreted in the same way as similar language in Title VII.
See Miles, 979 F. Supp. at 250 n.4.
151. Id. at 249-50. As stated by the court: "There is no conceivable reason why such conduct
should be rewarded with legal pardon just because, unbeknownst to [the professor] ... plaintiff was
not a biological female." Id. at 249.
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B. Critique of Current Title VII Doctrine
The refusal of federal courts to extend Title VII's protection to trans-
sexuals is unduly restrictive. One early decision by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit continues to be cited as controlling or persuasive by
other courts. In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,"2 the court refused
to allow a MTF transsexual who transitioned on the job and was then
fired to bring a Title VII claim for sex discrimination.' 3 The court rea-
soned that a "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction required
that the term "sex" be given its traditional meaning.' As further evi-
dence that Congress intended only the traditional meaning of "sex," the
court noted that attempts to amend Title VII to include "sexual orienta-
tion" discrimination had failed.' Applying a "plain meaning" analysis,
the court reasoned that Title VII's "prohibition against sex discrimination
in employment is to ensure that men and women are treated equally, ab-
sent a bona fide relationship between the qualifications for the job and
the person's sex."'56 In this one sentence, the court declared, without seri-
ous question, that there can only be two sexes-male and female.
1. There Are More Than Two Sexes
If Title VII must be read to protect only on the basis of biological
sex, then courts must recognize that there are more than two sexes. As
Professor Anne Fausto-Sterling has argued, according to current scien-
tific knowledge, there are at least five, and perhaps more, sexes.' 7 These
include male, female, and three types of intersexed persons-so-called
152. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
153. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
154. Id. at 662.
155. Id. at 662 n.6 (citing nine bills from 1975-77 which sought to add Title VII protection
based upon sexual orientation, all of which were defeated). Holloway was decided in 1977. At that
time, perhaps, judges were not familiar with the delineation between transsexualism and sexual
orientation. The need to add "sexual orientation" to Title VII's list of protected classes to effectuate
protection of homosexuals was necessary because courts had held that "sex discrimination" did not
include discrimination against homosexuals. See Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp.
1068, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Although scholars have argued that homophobia and sexism are closely
linked, courts have remained unwilling to expand the meaning of "sex" to include "sexual
orientation." See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title
Vi's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and
should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality." (quoting
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979))). The argument that "sex
discrimination" includes discrimination against transsexuals is a totally separate argument from the
argument regarding sexual orientation. Nonetheless, the Holloway court dismissed the argument in
less than a paragraph. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
156. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
157. See generally Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not
Enough, SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20-24. But see JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY
AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND THEIR
FAMILIES 6 (1994) (arguing that it does not "make sense to talk of a third sex, or of a fourth or fifth,
when the phylogenetic scheme of things is two sexes. Those who are genitally neither male nor
female but incomplete are not a third sex. They are a mixed sex or an in-between sex.").
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true hermaphrodites (herms), male pseudohermaphrodites (merms), and
female pseudohermaphrodites (ferms).155 According to John Money, as
many as four percent of all births may produce some variety of these
intersexed persons.'" Although most such newborns are assigned a sex
that is either male or female and are medically treated to help their bod-
ies conform to the assigned sex, their natural biological sex is mixed.
Sex reassignment surgery has also worked to create more than two
sexes. The biological male who undergoes surgery to become a woman
usually has a vaginoplasty. If physical appearance of genitalia were to
define femaleness, then post-op MTF transsexuals would typically qual-
ify as female. Since FTMs often forego phalloplasties, it is more difficult
to classify them as male on the basis of physical appearance of genitalia.
But to classify them as female would deny their reality. As opposed to
the situation in the past, when most transsexuals were committed to rela-
tively complete sex changes, an increased number of individuals, both
MTF and FTM, elect medical intervention involving less than a complete
change." Such persons go through life with bodies that we might de-
scribe as "intermediate," somewhere between male and female. '6
Every person has a sex. Title VII protects on the basis of sex and is
intended to protect every person, regardless of what the person's sex is.
Such an interpretation of Title VII is consistent with our liberal interpre-
tation of anti-discrimination law. 2 Title VII ought to protect discrimina-
tion against transsexuals not only in cases where they can prove that dis-
crimination occurred because they were perceived to be either male or
female, but also in cases in which the employer claims that discrimina-
tion occurred because the employee failed to fit within the neat binary
classification of male or female.
2. "Sex" Should Be Interpreted to Include Gender Expression
Although there is virtually no legislative history regarding the
meaning of "sex" when it was added to Title VII, it must have meant
more than biological sex. The image that senators had in mind when they
discussed the addition of sex was that it would require employers to hire
women with feminine roles and identities (e.g., wives and mothers tradi-
158. Fausto-Sterling, supra note 157, at 21.
159. Id.
160. See Rubin, supra note 54, at 476. This phenomenon, in part, is due to changing attitudes
and practices within the medical community. See id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983) ("To effectuate its
purpose of eradicating the evils of employment discrimination, Title VII should be given a liberal
construction. The impact of this construction is the broad interpretation given to the employer and
employee provisions." (citations omitted)); cf., e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) ("[Title VII's] terms are not limited to discrimination against members of
any particular race."). These and other cases recognizing the breadth of Title VII protections act to
reject a strict bipolar (black/white) approach to racial discrimination.
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tionally assigned to private sphere roles).'63 Some of them expounded on
the difficulties that would ensue as women moved from the private
sphere to the public sphere of work.'" And yet the bill passed. To give
effect to the bill, employers cannot require women to behave as men in
the workplace. Feminine values must be protected. To that end, Title
VII's coverage has been expanded by legislative amendment to cover
pregnancy'65 and it has been interpreted to cover sexual harassment.'"
"Sexual harassment" has recently been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to include same-sex harassment.'67 Accepting the fact that Congress
did not enact Title VII for the primary purpose of regulating same-sex
sexual harassment, the Oncale Court nonetheless applied Title VII to a
male on male sexual harassment claim, stating: "[S]tatutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."'6 8
If Title VII was intended to make it possible for females with femi-
nine sensibilities to work comfortably in the public sphere, then the
statutory protections must be interpreted to cover expressions of femi-
nine gender by transsexuals, whether or not the expression of such femi-
ninity by transsexuals was the principal concern of Congress. FTMs,
whom the law may identify as male post-transition, but who retain and
express their sense of the feminine, must be protected in order to carry
out the purpose of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. Similarly,
MTFs, who express their femininity during transition even though their
bodies may be more biologically male, must be protected.
3. MTF Transsexuals Must Be Protected in Order to Ensure Pro-
tection of Women, and FTM Transsexuals Must Be Protected in
Order to Ensure Protection of Both Men and Women
When a transsexual transitions on the job, a decision to fire the indi-
vidual often includes assumptions about the inappropriateness of the
163. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 2577-78 (1964) (statements of Rep. Celler).
164. See id.
165. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), amended the definitions section of Title VII by adding subsection (k) which
states, in part: "The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include... because of or on the
basis of pregnancy ......
166. The sexual harassment cases in particular have shown that Title VII was intended to
change the workplace from the male bastion that it was prior to Title VII to something different, a
place in which females with feminine sensibilities could work comfortably. See, e.g., Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1994) ("When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Tite VII is violated." (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)).
167. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that male-on-
male harassment of a sexual nature is covered by Title VII).
168. Id. at 1002.
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newly gendered person holding the same job as was held by the previ-
ously gendered person. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines69 is a prime example of
this situation. Ulane was attempting to keep her job as an airline pilot, a
job which at the time of the case was held almost exclusively by men.'7"
The decision to fire Ulane was likely prompted as much by a fear of fe-
male pilots as by a fear of transsexual pilots.
The situation presented in Ulane is not a unique one. Barbara Renee
James lost her job in the electrical sales division of a hardware store
when she transitioned from male to female.'7 ' And Jane Doe lost her job
as a Boeing engineer when she transitioned on the job.'72 It is probably
not coincidental that a number of litigated cases involve MTFs in jobs
that have been historically held by men.
Legal protection of MTFs who transition on the job, and who want
to continue holding jobs that have been identified as male jobs, is neces-
sary to assure legal protection for persons born female who wish to hold
those jobs. A primary purpose of Title VII is carried out if "sex" is read
to include "MTF transsexuals."'73
There is no evidence in the form of reported cases of a similar trend
involving FTMs. In fact, in the only two FTM anti-discrimination cases
that I found, the trial court judges both ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on
the motion to dismiss the complaint.'" However, it would not be surpris-
ing to find that women in "female" jobs who transitioned to being male
had a harder time with their employers than other FTMs in more "an-
drogynous" jobs. The story of Mario Martino suggests, for example, that
despite "her" excellent credentials and experience as a nurse, co-workers
avoided "him" and joked about "him" while he was in transition.'
Eventually, he changed jobs. Legal protection of FTMs who wish to re-
main in or retain jobs that are traditionally thought of as "feminine"
serves to protect persons born male who also wish to hold such jobs.
The stories from the Balkans show us that male roles that are tradi-
tionally honored and respected can be carried out by women passing as
men with the blessing of the community, so long as there are no males
169. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
170. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082-83.
171. James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478,480-81 (D. Kan. 1995).
172. Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533-34 (Wash. 1993).
173. See text supra accompanying note 168.
174. In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., the court held transsexuals were protected under New
York City human rights laws. 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96 (Sup. Ct. 1995). The second case
addressing FTMs, Conway v. City of Hartford, found transsexuals were protected under laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of mental disability, even if not protected under laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. No. CV 950553003, 1997 WL 78585, at *3-*7 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997).
175. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.a.
1358 [Vol. 75:4
HeinOnline  -- 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1358 1997-1998
TRANSSEXUALS & ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
available.176 Our own post-World War II history tells us that the same is
true of our culture. Rosie the Riveter was held in high esteem until the
male troops came home. Legal protection of women who pass as men in
order to hold masculine jobs," or of FTMs who transition in "masculine"
jobs, will help women who wish to hold such jobs. Thus, the purposes of
Title VII are better served by a statutory interpretation that includes
transsexual and transgendered persons within its protections.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current anti-discrimination law, in particular Title VII, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex. Most courts have interpreted this lan-
guage to exclude discrimination against transsexuals. A recent district
court opinion in New York suggests that Title VII may apply to trans-
sexual plaintiffs, provided the discriminator does not know that the
plaintiff is transsexual.' Such interpretations of sex discrimination law
are too limited. Transsexuals, even those who pass successfully in their
new gender roles, cannot be viewed as solely male or female. Their sto-
ries teach us that individual gender identity is too fluid to force all per-
sons into the bipolar scheme that current Title VII jurisprudence seems to
presume. Title VII's sex discrimination jurisprudence must be recon-
ceptualized to account for the reality of individuals who are both male
and female, whether at the same moment in time or at different moments
over time.
176. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
177. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 124, at 12-13 (discussing her experience passing as a
male museum guard).
178. Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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